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Abstract
Background: Following the emergence of the A/H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic, public health interventions were
activated to lessen its potential impact. Computer modelling and simulation can be used to determine the
potential effectiveness of the social distancing and antiviral drug therapy interventions that were used at the early
stages of the pandemic, providing guidance to public health policy makers as to intervention strategies in future
pandemics involving a highly pathogenic influenza strain.
Methods: An individual-based model of a real community with a population of approximately 30,000 was used to
determine the impact of alternative interventions strategies, including those used in the initial stages of the 2009
pandemic. Different interventions, namely school closure and antiviral strategies, were simulated in isolation and in
combination to form different plausible scenarios. We simulated epidemics with reproduction numbers R0of 1.5,
which aligns with estimates in the range 1.4-1.6 determined from the initial outbreak in Mexico.
Results: School closure of 1 week was determined to have minimal effect on reducing overall illness attack rate.
Antiviral drug treatment of 50% of symptomatic cases reduced the attack rate by 6.5%, from an unmitigated rate
of 32.5% to 26%. Treatment of diagnosed individuals combined with additional household prophylaxis reduced the
final attack rate to 19%. Further extension of prophylaxis to close contacts (in schools and workplaces) further
reduced the overall attack rate to 13% and reduced the peak daily illness rate from 120 to 22 per 10,000
individuals. We determined the size of antiviral stockpile required; the ratio of the required number of antiviral
courses to population was 13% for the treatment-only strategy, 25% for treatment and household prophylaxis and
40% for treatment, household and extended prophylaxis. Additional simulations suggest that coupling school
closure with the antiviral strategies further reduces epidemic impact.
Conclusions: These results suggest that the aggressive use of antiviral drugs together with extended school
closure may substantially slow the rate of influenza epidemic development. These strategies are more rigorous
than those actually used during the early stages of the relatively mild 2009 pandemic, and are appropriate for
future pandemics that have high morbidity and mortality rates.
Background
A novel strain of the A/H1N1 influenza virus has
rapidly spread around the world, leading to the first
influenza pandemic since 1968. While current data indi-
cates that this influenza virus results in mild symptoms
and relatively low mortality characteristics, it allows us
to examine interventions strategies that will be necessary
for a future highly pathogenic influenza strain when, as
with the 2009 pandemic, no suitable vaccine will be
initially available. The 2009 pandemic virus first
appeared in Mexico in April 2009 and later spread
around the world, causing at least 15292 deaths as of
12th February 2010 [1]. Due to its worldwide spread the
World Health Organization (WHO) lifted its pandemic
alert to phase 6, the highest alert phase. Phase 6 indi-
cates human-to-human transmission of a novel influ-
enza strain with sustained community level outbreaks in
two or more countries in one WHO region and
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in another region. As of the 12
th February 2010; 37,693
laboratory confirmed cases and 191 deaths have been
reported in Australia [2].
The use of both pharmaceutical and social distancing
interventions are embedded within the pandemic prepa-
redness plans of most countries [3-5] and also appear in
recent WHO recommendations [6]. School closure,
household quarantine and reduced workplace, social and
community contacts are considered to be key non-phar-
maceutical interventions which may readily be used for
the early containment of an influenza epidemic. These
social distancing measures have been shown in model-
ling studies to delay the overall impact of a pandemic,
as well as allowing time for antiviral drug administration
and the development of appropriate vaccines [7,8].
Neuraminidase inhibitor antiviral drugs and appropriate
vaccines are the key pharmaceutical interventions, with
antiviral drugs being the only available pharmaceutical
interventions available when faced with a novel strain of
influenza virus in the early phase of pandemic, as has
occurred in 2009. Social distancing measures, such as
school closure, and antiviral drug strategies have been
used in the initial stages of the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic
in Australia and other parts of the world [9,10].
The effectiveness of the various pandemic contain-
ment measures used is not fully understood due to a
lack of field data [11]. Simulation models have therefore
been developed to understand the dynamics of pan-
demics and to analyze the benefit of potential contain-
ment strategies, such as those that are recommended in
pandemic preparedness plans. Modelling techniques for
the study of infectious respiratory diseases such as pan-
demic influenza have included deterministic [12-14],
stochastic [15-17] and individual-based models [18-25].
These studies use models that range in scale from the
whole world [12,15,16], through large [20,22] and small
[19,21] countries, to actual [7,8] and synthetic [23,26]
small communities. The outcome of modelling studies
used to assess the effectiveness of various proposed
interventions are sensitive to the operational details of
the interventions (such as the timing and duration of
school closure [7,27,28]) and to the particular combina-
tion of interventions used. Prior to the occurrence of a
pandemic, modelling studies have made plausible
assumptions about these details. However, due to the
number of combinations of intervention types, variation
in intervention details and possible emergent virus char-
acteristics, exhaustive analysis has been impossible. Hav-
ing now observed the response to a pandemic, we are in
a position to model in detail several different interven-
tion strategies which were actually used and which,
therefore, are highly likely to be considered for use in
future pandemics or in resurgent waves of the current
pandemic. Furthermore, we have focussed on epidemics
with the estimated characteristics of the A/H1N1 2009
pandemic.
The purpose of this study was to examine the inter-
ventions used in Australia (and subsequently in other
countries) during the early stages of the 2009 influenza
pandemic, to determine their effectiveness (in reducing
the illness attack rate) and cost (in terms of the required
number of antiviral courses), and further determine
whether alternative intervention strategies would have
been more effective. We modelled the spread dynamics
within a simulation model using virus characteristics
estimated from data obtained at an early phase of the
Mexico epidemic [29], and we simulated the key fea-
tures of the actual school closure and antiviral-based
strategies used in the initial stages of the outbreak in
Australia. We present results from an examination of a
range of school closure and antiviral drug strategies, sin-
gly and in combination, to determine their effectiveness.
The results suggest strategies that are more effective
t h a nt h o s er e c e n t l yu s e d( i nA u s t r a l i aa n do t h e rc o u n -
t r i e s )a n dw h i c hm a yn e e dt ob ec o n s i d e r e db yp u b l i c
health authorities as they revise their Pandemic Prepa-
redness Plans. The results provide guidance as to the
optimum strategies required to contain or significantly
limit the impact of a future, possibly highly pathogenic,
pandemic influenza strain.
Methods
We used a detailed individual-based model of a real
community in the south west of Western Australia
(Albany) with a population of approximately 30,000 to
simulate the dynamics of the 2009 influenza pandemic
[7,8,30].
Population contact network
The simulation model captures the contact dynamics of
the population of Albany, Western Australia using cen-
sus and state and local government data [31], allowing
us to replicate the individual age and household struc-
ture of all households in this town of approximately
30,000 individuals. Human contact networks were mod-
elled as a network of connected households and contact
hubs such as schools, childcare centres, workplaces and
a regional hospital. Individuals in each household and
hub made contacts within a close contact mixing group,
taken to be the entire household or a subset of larger
hubs, and also made additional non-hub based random
contacts in the wider community. Using this commu-
nity-based population model, we conducted stochastic,
individual-based spatial simulations of the A/H1N1
2009 swine flu strain currently circulating in Australia.
We assumed that an average of one new infection per
day was stochastically introduced into the population
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tion period was divided into 12 hour day/night cycles
and during each simulation cycle a nominal location of
each individual was determined; taking into considera-
tion the cycle type (day/night, weekday/weekend), infec-
tion state of each individual and whether child
supervision was needed to look after a child at home.
Individuals occupying the same location during the
same time period (cycle) were assumed to come into
potential infective contact. Details of the underlying
model are presented in [7] and in that reference’s online
supporting material.
Influenza transmission model
In the simulation model we a s s u m e dt h a ti n f e c t i o u s
transmission could occur when an infectious and sus-
ceptible individual came into contact during a simula-
tion cycle. Following each contact a new infection state
for the susceptible individual (either to remain suscepti-
ble or to become infected) was randomly chosen via a
Bernoulli trail [32]. Once “infected” an individual pro-
gressed through a series of infection states according to
a fixed timeline. The SEIR state progression dynamics of
individuals is illustrated in Figure 1a.
The transmission probability that a susceptible indivi-
dual would be infected by an infectious individual was
calculated according to the following transmission func-
tion, which takes into account the disease infectivity of
the infectious individual Ii and the susceptibility of sus-
ceptible individual Is at the time of contact. A descrip-
tion of each component of the following probability
function is given in Table 1:
P Inf Susc AVF trans i s i s i s II I I II (,) () () (,)     
The baseline transmission coefficient b was initially
chosen to give an epidemic with a final attack rate of
17.4% which is consistent with seasonal influenza as
estimated in Table three of [33]. To achieve simulations
under a range of reproductive numbers, b was increased
from this baseline value to achieve epidemics of various
R0 magnitudes; Details of the procedure for estimating b
and R0 are given in [7]. The basic reproductive number
R0 for A/H1N1 2009 influenza virus was initially esti-
mated to be between 1.4 and 1.6 [29,11]; more recent
estimates range from 1.2 [34] to 2.3 [9]; We assume an
R0 of 1.5 as being the midpoint of both ranges.
The disease infectivity parameter Inf(Ii) was set to 1
for symptomatic individuals at the peak period of infec-
tion and then to 0.5 for the rest of the infectivity period
The infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals is also
assumed to be 0.5 and this applies to all infected indivi-
duals after the latent period but before onset of symp-
toms (see Figure 1b). The infection profile of a
symptomatic individual was assumed to last for 6 days
as follows: a 0.5 day latent period (with Inf(Ii) set to 0)
is followed by 1 day asymptomatic and infectious, where
Inf(Ii) is set to 0.5; then 2 days at peak infectiousness
(with Inf(Ii) set to 1.0); followed by 2.5 days reduced
infectiousness (with Inf(Ii) set to 0.5). For an infected
but asymptomatic individual the whole infectious period
(of 5.5 days) is at the reduced level of infectiousness
with Inf(Ii) set to 0.5. This infectivity profile is a simpli-
fication of the infectivity distribution found in a study of
viral shedding [35]. As reported below in the results sec-
tion for the unmitigated no intervention scenario, these
assumptions regarding the duration of latent and infec-
tious periods lead to a mean generation time (serial
interval) of 2.47 days which is consistent with that esti-
mated for A/H1N1 2009 influenza [29].
Following infection an individual is assumed to be
immune to re-infection for the duration of the simula-
tion. We further assume that influenza symptoms
develop one day into the infectious period [35], with
20% of infections being asymptomatic among children
and 32% being asymptomatic among adults. These per-
centages were derived by summing the age-specific anti-
body titres determined in Table five of [36].
Symptomatic individuals will withdraw into the home
with the following probabilities; adults 50% and children
90%, which is in keeping with the work of [20,21].
The susceptibility parameter Susc(Is) is a function
directly dependent on the age of the susceptible indivi-
dual. It captures age-varying susceptibility to transmis-
sion due to either partial prior immunity or age-related
differences in contact behaviour. To achieve a realistic
age specific infection rate, the age-specific susceptibility
parameters were calibrated against the serologic infec-
tion rates for seasonal H3N2 in 1977-1978 in Tecumseh,
Michigan [33]. The resulting age-specific attack rates are
consistent with A/H1N1 2009 influenza [37], with a
higher attack rate in children and young adults (details
may be found in [7]).
The antiviral efficacy factor AVF(Ii, Is)=( 1-A V E i)*
(1 - AVEs) represents the potential reduction in infec-
tiousness of an infected individual (denoted by AVEi)
induced by antiviral treatment, and the reduction in sus-
ceptibility of a susceptible individual (denoted by AVEs)
induced by antiviral prophylaxis. When no antiviral
intervention was administrated the values of both AVEi
and AVEs were assumed to be 0, indicating no reduc-
tion in infectiousness or susceptibility. However, when
antiviral treatment was being applied to the infectious
individual the value of AVEi was set at 0.66, capturing a
reduction in infectiousness by factor of 66% [38]. Simi-
larly, when the susceptible individual was undergoing
antiviral prophylaxis the value of AVEs was set to 0.85
indicating a reduction in susceptibility by a factor of
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modelling studies, which assume an AVE of 30% (e.g.
[20,22,27]). This common assumption appears to stem
from an estimate made in [26] based on 1998-1999 trial
data. Our higher value is based on a more comprehen-
sive estimation process reported in [38], which also
incorporated an data from an additional study per-
formed in 2000-2001 [39]. It is also in line with esti-
mates of 64%-89% reported in [40].
School closure and antiviral drug interventions
We analysed three different school closure strategies
and three different antiviral intervention strategies that
were used in Australia, the United Kingdom and the
USA during the early stages of the 2009 influenza
pandemic. The mitigating effect attained when applied
to an outbreak of influenza A/H1N1 swine flu within
the simulated Albany community was determined by
comparing the resulting daily and cumulative illness
attack rates with that of an unmitigated outbreak. We
assumed that an infected, symptomatic individual would
be diagnosed with a probability of 0.5. Note that by
“diagnosis”, we do not necessarily mean laboratory con-
firmed diagnosis of influenza - rather, we mean that an
individual is symptomatic to a degree that triggers the
interventions being modelled here. In the case of school
closure, this means that a case in a pupil or teacher
comes to the attention of the school or public health
administration; in the case of antiviral interventions this
means that the individual (or his/her) family seeks help
Figure 1 Dynamics of influenza progression within host individuals. (a) Dynamics of influenza A/H1N12009 progression within host
individuals. (b) Infectivity curve of an infectious individual due to influenza infection.
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The intervention measures considered are as follows.
School closure scenarios
For each of the school closure strategies described below
we assumed that 100% of individuals affected by school
closure or isolation made none of their regular school
hub contacts during the daytime cycle, but came into
contact with other individuals present in their house-
hold, and made their usual community contacts (we
a s s u m e dt h a tn oadditional community contact
occurred for these individuals - community contact was
deemed to occur in all daytime cycles for active indivi-
duals, regardless of whether they were present at a hub
or home, and this remained true during school closure).
We also assumed that when a primary school aged child
(age 5-12) was isolated in a household, one adult from
the household stayed at home. We assume that these
school closure policies are in place at the start of the
local epidemic, but with the school case isolation and
individual school closure strategies, actions to isolate
groups or close only occur as cases appear in each
school as described below.
School Case Isolation (SCI) with close contact group
We assumed that the diagnosed school case was iso-
lated from the school along with a set of class mem-
bers (approximate size of classes taken to be 30). The
isolated individuals spent daytime cycles at home
rather than at school for a given period ranging from 1
to 4 weeks, the intent being to reduce the potential
spread of disease among the other school members.
We further assumed that school case isolation (SCI)
only applied to primary and high schools and not child
care centres. This intervention was used in certain
Australian states in the early stages of the A/H1N1
2009 pandemic [3].
Individual School Closure
In this intervention strategy we assumed that the whole
primary school was closed if there was a case diagnosed.
If there was an initial diagnosed case in a high school,
the diagnosed case and class members were isolated
from the school. If there was a further diagnosed case in
another class then that case and class were also isolated.
If there were more than two diagnosed cases in different
classes in a high school then we assumed that the whole
s c h o o lw o u l db ec l o s e d .A tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h ep a n -
demic this strategy was also followed in Australia, the
United Kingdom and the USA [3,41,42].
All Schools Closure
This strategy assumed that all schools and child care
centres in a community would be closed simultaneously
after a certain number of cases (30, or 0.1% of the popu-
lation) in the community had been diagnosed. This
strategy was followed in Osaka and Hyogo in Japan [9].
Note that we assumed that school closure would be
triggered at most twice for each school, on the grounds
that repeated opening and closing of schools would be
considered to be too disruptive, even for short periods
of school closure. Our community model contained 22
schools.
Antiviral drug scenarios
Treatment of Diagnosed Case (T)
We assumed that all diagnosed individuals would receive
antiviral drug treatment at the time of their diagnosis.
(24 hours after the appearance of symptoms) This treat-
ment involved two doses taken daily for 5 days to reduce
the infectiousness and infectious period of disease
[19,20]. We assumed that treatment would reduce infec-
tiousness of a symptomatic individual by 66% [38]. A
further assumption regarding antiviral treatment is that
that the duration of infectiousness of a diagnosed
Table 1 Detailed description of each component of the transmission function
Component of transmission
function
Description
Ptrans(Ii, Is) Probability of disease transmission from infected to susceptible individual.
b Disease transmission coefficient, chosen to achieve baseline epidemics with specific R0 values.
Susc(Is) Age specific susceptibility of infectee or susceptible individual.
Inft(Ii) Infectiousness of infector as a function of time since infection and symptomatic status.
AVF(Ii, Is) Antiviral factor which reduces transmission probability when antiviral based interventions are applied to
individuals Ii, Is or both.
The following different situations may arise when we model antiviral effectiveness.
AVF(Ii, Is) = 1 - AVEi if the infected individual is treated with antiviral drugs and no antiviral prophylaxis is applied to the susceptible
individual
AVF(Ii, Is) = 1 - AVEs if antiviral prophylaxis are applied to the susceptible individual and no antiviral treatment is used with the
infected individual
AVF(Ii, Is) = (1-AVEi)*(1-AVEs) if both infected and susceptible individuals are receiving antiviral drugs for treatment and prophylaxis
respectively
AVF(Ii, Is)=1 if neither infector nor susceptible individuals are receiving antiviral drugs
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vention was initially used in certain Australian states at
the beginning of the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic [3] and
also used in USA, UK and Japan [41,42] [Yasuda2009].
Household Based Prophylaxis (T+H)
In this strategy we assumed that all diagnosed individuals
would receive antiviral treatment. We further assumed
that all household members of a diagnosed individual
would be given antiviral drugs for prophylaxis, beginning
at the same time as treatment of the diagnosed case, with
each prophylaxis course consisting of one dose taken
daily for 10 days [19-22]. We modelled the effect of pro-
phylaxis on a susceptible individual as a reduction in sus-
ceptibility by 85% [38]. In addition, individuals who did
become infected while taking prophylaxis had a 50%
reduction in the chance of developing a symptomatic ill-
ness [3]. At the beginning of the pandemic this strategy
was also followed by some states in Australia [2].
Extended Prophylaxis (T+H+E)
In this strategy the prophylactic use of antiviral drugs was
extended to a wider group of contacts. Here prophylaxis
courses were given to the class members (if the case is
diagnosed in school) or to the mixing group (if the case
is diagnosed in a workplace hub) of a diagnosed case in
addition to their household members. This strategy was
also followed in some states in Australia, in the UK and
USA at the early stages of the pandemic [2,41,42].
Note that for all antiviral scenarios we assumed that a
person would receive at most two prophylactic courses.
For example, a person might receive a first course if a
household member were diagnosed, and later might
receive another course if a school classmate were diag-
nosed, but no further prophylactic course would occur if
a third close contact were diagnosed. We also assumed
that prophylaxis would not be administered once a per-
son had experienced symptomatic infection. Treated
individuals were not assumed to otherwise behave differ-
ently from other symptomatic individuals i.e. 50% of
adults and 90% of children were assumed to withdraw to
their household for the duration of their infection. All
individuals taking prophylaxis courses were assumed to
maintain their normal contacts during the daytime cycle.
In addition to determining the final and daily attack
rates of the simulated epidemics, we also recorded the
number of antiviral courses used. From this we also
derived a measure of antiviral efficiency: the number of
prevented cases per antiviral course. This was calculated
as follows:
Number of prevented cases per AV
total cases
Intervention 
    prevented due to intervention total AV courses used
case
/
 s s without intervention cases with intervention total AV –/     courses used
Results
We initially simulated an unmitigated epidemic within
the Albany community to determine the illness attack
rate that would result if no interventions were in place.
This was followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of
the interventions, singly and in combination, via a series
of simulation experiments which determined the reduc-
tion in attack rate which could be achieved by activation
of the following: alternative school closure interventions
without any antiviral-based interventions; alternative
antiviral-based interventions without school closure
interventions; and antiviral interventions in conjunction
with school closure of different durations.
Dynamics of disease spread under no-intervention
scenario
Baseline no intervention simulations were conducted for
reproduction numbers R0 ranging from 1.4 to 1.6, esti-
mated to be the basic reproduction number for the A/
H1N1 2009 pandemic [29,11]. The outcomes of simu-
lated epidemics varied stochastically due to the random
location of individuals who are seeded into the modelled
community as infectious index cases and the probabilis-
tic nature of infection transmission. Results for all simu-
lated epidemics are averages of 40 runs, each with
stochastic choices made with a different random-num-
ber sequence. This process is described in detail in [7].
As we assumed a continuous influx of infectious cases
from outside the simulation boundary at a rate of one
per day, we achieved a sustained epidemic for every
simulation, following the approach adopted in [7]. Final
attack rates ranged from 27% to 37% corresponding to
R0 values of 1.4 to 1.6, respectively while peak daily inci-
dence rates ranged from 82 to 159 cases per 10,000 peo-
ple. The characteristics (means and standard deviations)
of epidemics with an R0 of 1.5 are as follows: final infec-
tion rate (symptomatic and asymptomatic) of 43.9% (S.
D. 1.09); final attack rate (symptomatic) of 32.5% (S.D.
0.77); peak ill population 6.6% (S.D. 0.46); peak daily ill-
ness case load (per 10,000) of 121 cases (S.D. 9); day of
epidemic peak, day 45 (S.D. 4.74); serial interval 2.47
days (S.D. 0.01). The derived serial interval depends
upon the latent and infectious durations and on the
transmissibility of the virus. Our assumptions about
these durations were based on seasonal influenza; when
combined with a transmissibility calibrated to give an R0
of 1.5 (which we adopt in this study), the resulting serial
interval of 2.47 days is also consistent with estimates of
1.3 - 2.71 days for the 2009 pandemic [29,9]. The char-
acteristics of epidemics with R0 values of 1.4, 1.5 and
1.6 are listed in Table 2. Note that these characteristics
apply to an epidemic within a community with the
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age distribution, distribution of household sizes and
structures, number and size of school and workplace
hubs and so forth).
Impact of school closure based interventions
We investigated the impact of school closure based
interventions for an epidemic with an R0 of 1.5, the
mid-point in the range of estimated basic reproductive
numbers for A/H1N1 2009 influenza [29,11]. The
results of different school closure interventions (Figure
2, daily incident rate (top left) and final attack rate (top
right)) show that 1 week of school closure (for a maxi-
mum of two closures, that is a school may close, reopen
and then close again) has minimal effect on reducing
the epidemic size. A 2.5% cumulative attack rate reduc-
tion (from a baseline attack rate of 32.5% to an attack
rate 30%) can be achieved by the Individual School Clo-
sure strategy, for example. When considering the daily
incidence rate, there is also minimal benefit among the
alternative school closure strategies of 1 week’sd u r a t i o n
(Figure 2, top left). However previous work suggests
that school closure for longer durations may have a sig-
nificant impact on reducing epidemic severities in terms
of both the cumulative attack rate and the peak daily
incidence rate [7].
Impact of antiviral based interventions
Our simulations suggest that antiviral drug treatment
for diagnosed symptomatic cases and its prophylactic
use in close and extended contact groups can signifi-
cantly reduce the size and severity of a local epidemic.
For an influenza virus with a reproductive number of
R0 = 1.5 and a diagnosis rate of 50% of all sympto-
matic individuals (a possible, realistic assumption) the
antiviral treatment of diagnosed cases (with no prophy-
laxis to close contacts) reduced the overall illness
attack rate by 6.5% from the unmitigated attack rate
32.5% to 26%. A further reduction in attack rate can
be observed from simulation experiments if household
prophylaxis and extended prophylaxis are in effect
during the pandemic period. A reduction of 13.5% of
symptomatic cases can be achieved (32.5% to 19%)
using a household prophylaxis (T+H) strategy and a
19.5% reduction (32.5% to 13%) achieved if an
extended prophylaxis (T+H+E) strategy is used (Figure
2, centre right). These antiviral-based pharmaceutical
interventions also reduce the daily incidence rate (Fig-
ure 2, centre left, per 10,000). Without any concurrent
school closure, a treatment-only (T) strategy results in
a reduction of 33 symptomatic cases in the epidemic
peak (from 120 to 87), a treatment and household pro-
phylaxis strategy (T+H) gives a peak reduction of 74
symptomatic cases (from 120 to 46), while the treat-
ment and extended prophylaxis strategy (T+H+E) gives
a 96 case reduction in the epidemic peak (from 120 to
24), all per 10,000 individuals.
Impact of antiviral based interventions combined with
individual school closure
We then examined the coupling of the three antiviral
strategies with the Individual School Closure strategy for
school closure periods of 1 to 4 weeks. For each of the
antiviral strategies simulated, longer periods of school
closure resulted in essentially linear reductions in cumu-
lative attack rates; from the baseline unmitigated attack
rate of 32.5% 4 weeks of school closure resulted in final
attack rates of 25%, 19%, 12% and 9% for closure with
no antiviral therapy, and combined with the T, T+H and
T+H+E strategies respectively (see Figure 3).
The combined strategies also gave significant reduc-
tions in daily case incidence rate. From the baseline
unmitigated peak daily incidence rate of 120 (per
10,000) 4 weeks of school closure resulted in peak daily
incidence rates of 45, 30, 18 and 14 with no antivirals,
and combined with theT, T+H and T+H+E antiviral
strategies respectively (see Figure 4). In the case of the
treatment and treatment plus household prophylaxis
strategies the addition of 4 weeks of school closure
results in more than twice the reduction in peak daily
incidence rate when compared to the use of antivirals
without school closure.
Table 2 Simulated characteristics of baseline (no-intervention) epidemics for R0 values
R0
1.4 1.5 1.6
Characteristics Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Final Infection Rate (%) 36.3 1.32 43.9 1.09 50.4 1.02
Final Attack Rate (%) 26.9 0.95 32.5 0.77 37.2 0.74
Peak Symptomatic Population (%) 4.45 0.49 6.6 0.46 8.74 0.51
Peak Daily incidence Rate (per 10000) 82 8 121 9 159 10
Peak Attack Day 51 7.7 45 4.74 40 4.48
Serial Interval 2.49 0.01 2.47 0.01 2.45 0.01
Means and standard deviations (S.D.) are for 40 simulation runs, each with stochastic choices made with different random-number sequences.
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Page 7 of 14Figure 2 Epidemic progression curve expressed as daily incidence rate and cumulative illness rate. Top pair shows comparison among
different school closure strategies with 1 week closing period. Central pair indicates the potential impact of antiviral drug usage during
simulated pandemic period. Bottom pair illustrates the combined effectiveness of individual school closure for 1 week and antiviral strategies
during pandemic. Results are illustrated in terms of daily incidence rate (symptomatic cases per day, left column) and cumulative symptomatic
attack rate (percentage of population, right column).
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Our results indicate that more antiviral courses would
be consumed by the extended antiviral prophylaxis
strategy (T+H+E) compared to the antiviral treatment
(T) and household antiviral prophylaxis (T+H)s t r a t e -
gies. An extra 14% (21% to 35%) of antiviral courses is
required to achieve an additional 4% reduction (15% to
11%) in the final attack rate with the T+H+E strategy
compared to the T+H strategy when both interventions
are coupled with Individual School Closure o f2w e e k s .
The required ratio of antiviral courses to the popula-
tion size is relatively higher using the extended anti-
viral prophylaxis strategy than the other antiviral based
strategies (see Figure 5). We have presented the
amount of antiviral courses as a % of the total popula-
tion; therefore our results are scale free and are
directly applicable to larger populations than that
simulated. The number of prevented cases per antiviral
course is 0.44 for the treatment strategy, 0.55 for treat-
ment and household prophylaxis and 0.48 using the
Figure 3 Final attack rate of epidemics with concurrent school closure and antiviral based strategies. Final attack rate (% of population)
is presented for an epidemic with R0 = 1.5 and different antiviral based strategies in conjunction with individual school closure for variable
school closure durations (0 week to 4 weeks).
Figure 4 Peak daily incidence rate of epidemic with concurrent school closure and antiviral based strategies. The figure illustrates the
impact of different durations of school closure coupled with antiviral based strategies on peak daily incidence rate during an epidemic. Peak
daily incidence rate is expressed in symptomatic cases per 10000 population.
Halder et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:168
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/168
Page 9 of 14treatment and extended prophylaxis strategy, all
assuming no school closure.
The summarized results giving Final Attack Rate
(FAR), Peak Daily Incidence Rate (PDIR) and Required
Antiviral Courses (RAV), expressed as a percentage of
the population for each of the different intervention
policies are listed in Table 3.
Discussion
Using a detailed individual based model of an actual
community we have evaluated interventions which were
administrated during the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic in
Australia and other countries. We have analysed the
effectiveness of school closure and the use of neuramini-
dase inhibitor antiviral interventions as a means of redu-
cing the number of infected individuals. Social
distancing and antiviral drug interventions were the only
public health measures available during the first 6
months of the pandemic, due to the initial lack of a sui-
table vaccine. These strategies, deemed as key strategies
i nt h ep a n d e m i cp r e p a r e d n e s sp l a n so ft h eU n i t e d
States, United Kingdom, Australia and elsewhere [4,5,3],
have been shown by previous modelling studies to play
a prominent role in the early containment of a future
H5N1 pandemic [20,22-24]. In the modelling study pre-
sented here we have examined the potential benefit of
the sustained use of a range of antiviral drug and school
closure strategies, suggesting strategies which may be
more effective than those actually adopted.
Our results give guidance as to which mitigating, con-
trol and containment strategies may perform better than
those used in the early phases of the 2009 pandemic.
While the 2009/2010 influenza pandemic has been clas-
sified as mild by the World Health Organisation and the
Centre for Disease Control and Prevention [43,41] these
results will have relevance to future influenza pandemics
Figure 5 Required antiviral courses (% of population) for an epidemic with R0 =1 . 5 . The figure illustrates the consumption of antiviral
drugs for different antiviral strategies combined with school closures during a pandemic.
Table 3 Simulated outcomes for epidemics with different
interventions
R0
1.4 1.5 1.6
Intervention
Policies
FAR PDIR RAV FAR PDIR RAV FAR PDIR RAV
No intervention 27.9 82 0 32.5 121 0 37.2 159 0
ISC 23.5 53 0 29.3 74 0 34.1 100 0
T 21.1 54 10.4 26.6 84 13.3 32.2 120 16.0
T+H 12.6 24 18.4 18.7 41 25.2 23.4 62 30.3
T+H+E 9.0 15 30.6 13.0 22 40.2 19.9 39 45.8
T + ISC 16.9 32 8.5 23.8 53 11.5 27.9 77 14.1
T + H + ISC 10.1 14 14.2 14.8 23 20.8 20.8 41 26.9
T + H + E + ISC 7.1 10 25.0 10.9 17 35.3 15.5 30 44.8
Simulated Final Attack Rate % (FAR), Peak Daily Incidence Rate per 10,000
population (PDIR) and Required Anti Viral courses % (RAV) for epidemics with
different interventions. Interventions abbreviations: T - antiviral treatment,
H - household antiviral prophylaxis, E - extended prophylaxis, ISC - individual
school closure (2 weeks duration, maximum of 2 closures per school).
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Page 10 of 14which may be significantly more pathogenic, with higher
case fatality rates than those seen in 2009. The results
are thus of relevance to public health authorities as they
digest the lessons learned from the 2009 outbreak and
their responses to it.
At the early stage of the 2009 pandemic strategies
such as school closures and antiviral drug application
for treatment and prophylaxis were used in many coun-
tries with the intent of containing disease spread. These
strategies appeared to have had only limited success,
with the notable exception of Japan where early, large
scale closure of schools suppressed an outbreak that was
spreading rapidly amongst school-aged children [43].
Here the application of 1-2 weeks of school closure con-
tained an outbreak stemming from a small number of
early imported cases, and consequentially the progress
of the pandemic was delayed by approximately 6 weeks
[34].
In many countries there was an apparent hesitancy to
use antiviral drugs aggressively and extensively, even at
the early stages of the pandemic. This hesitancy may
have been due to either the fear of running out of an
antiviral stockpile while emergence of human transmis-
s i b l eH 5 N 1i ss t i l lar e a lr i s k ,o rm a yh a v eb e e nd u et o
worries regarding emergence of antiviral-resistant strains
of the A/H1N1 2009 influenza virus [43,44]. The
approach taken by many countries in 2009 generally
involved use of antiviral drugs for treatment and (lim-
ited) prophylaxis coupled with contact tracing during
the initial stages, quickly changing to treatment only
and then to partial treatment (i.e. only some diagnosed
cases receiving antiviral treatment). In the initial stages
the use of antivirals was often coupled with 1 week of
school closure or class isolation at home [45]. We have
modelled these strategies together with more rigorous
strategies to determine (1) whether the strategies used
would have been effective from a contain and control
perspective and (2) whether more effective strategies, in
terms of reduction in attack rate, can be determined.
The better strategies suggested by our results involve a
more aggressive and sustained use of antiviral drugs (for
both treatment and prophylaxis) and longer school clo-
sures than that which occurred.
The results indicate that a treatment and prophylaxis
strategy generates a greater reduction in the number of
cases when compared to treatment alone, with the
extended strategy working best. However such a strategy
requires a significantly larger antiviral drug stockpile
than treatment-only or treatment and household-only
prophylaxis. Given the financial limits faced by many
countries in creating and maintaining antiviral stockpiles
our results suggest that a sustained treatment and
household prophylaxis strategy appears optimal, in
terms of the ratio of illnesses avoided to antiviral
courses required. This strategy is feasible if a stockpile
of 252,000 antiviral courses is available per 1 million of
a population, which may be determined from our results
on stockpile size. If a larger stockpile is available, or it
can be rapidly replenished, then a sustained treatment
plus extended prophylaxis regimen is recommended. In
this case, our results estimate that a stockpile of 402,000
courses per 1 million of a population would be required.
If no additional school closure is to be utilized 132,000
courses are required for treatment-only per 1 million of
the population.
However if school closure is also activated, such as
closure of individual schools for 2 weeks, then the
required stockpile of antiviral drugs reduces to 115,000
courses for a treatment-only antiviral strategy, 208,000
for treatment and household prophylaxis and 352,000
for treatment and extended prophylaxis, again per 1 mil-
lion population.
These results are applicable for a pandemic with a
basic reproduction number R0 of 1.5 and a plausible
diagnosis rate of 50% of symptomatic individuals, with
diagnosis occurring 24 hours post symptom appearance.
As diagnosis is assumed to be necessary for antiviral
treatment (and contact prophylaxis) to occur, rapid
diagnosis may only be possible if diagnosis is based on
influenza-like illness (ILI) symptoms rather than serolo-
gical testing.
Our simulations suggest that treatment with house-
hold prophylaxis may be the better strategy. When
coupled with 2 weeks of school closure, the treatment
plus household prophylaxis strategy has the greatest
number of prevented cases per course ratio (0.85 cases/
antiviral course), compared to treatment only (0.75
cases/antiviral course) and the treatment plus extended
prophylaxis strategy (0.61 cases/antiviral course). Using
this measure to determine optimal use of an antiviral
stockpile, that is the prevented cases to antiviral courses
required ratio, the treatment plus household prophylaxis
strategy may be considered optimal. In addition, it may
reduce the chance of antiviral resistance development
given the lesser amount of prophylaxis occurring com-
pared to the extended strategy. While little antiviral
drug resistance to A/H1N1 was detected during the
2009 pandemic, the level of antiviral used which this
study indications would be required for sustained pro-
phylaxis strategies may be significantly increase the
chance of antiviral resistant strains emerging.
With regard to the effectiveness of school closure stra-
tegies our results suggest that the closure of individual
schools is the preferred strategy, compared to when all
schools close simultaneousl yo ro n eo fo n l yr e m o v i n g
and isolating diagnosed cases and their contacts. That
the individual school strategy out-performs the all-
school closure strategy is due to its adaptive nature;
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individual school) and when cases within individual
schools arise. Closing all schools together is less than
optimal as some of the schools closed may well have no
infectious cases present. For the three school closure
strategies examined we find that closure of one week
has limited impact and closure of two or more weeks is
increasingly more effective, in a linear manner.
In the absence of intervention our model assumes an
age-specific attack rate that is higher in children and
young adults (see Methods section), which is consistent
with A/H1N1 2009 influenza [37]. Previous modelling
studies, such as prior work by the authors with the
same simulation model used here (see [7] supplementary
info), and others [17], have found that, as might be
expected, school closure is less effective in the case of
uniform age-specific attack rates.
Related research
We have identified 12 previous simulation studies that
deal with the use of antiviral interventions for pandemic
influenza mitigation
[19,20,26,21,22,24,46,25,14,27,47,37]. Five of these can
be meaningfully compared to our study, being both
methodologically similar (individual-based models) and
examining similar interventions at similar reproduction
numbers [20,22,26,25,47]. Four of these found results
broadly consistent with our results [20,26,25,47]; these
used baseline (unmitigated) epidemics with final attack
rates in the range 30%-34.5% and found that antiviral
treatment plus prophylaxis to households resulted in
final attack rate reductions of 41%-54%, requiring anti-
viral stockpile sizes of from 410,000 to 580,000 per mil-
lion population. Our comparable result finds a similar
attack rate reduction (40%) but is more optimistic in
terms of stockpile requirement (250,000). This may arise
as a consequence of our assumption of a higher prophy-
lactic efficiency (85%, compared to 30% for these stu-
dies), which is based on a more recent analysis of
antiviral effectiveness studies [38,40]).
The work of Germann et al [22] appears to be an out-
lier, finding the treatment plus household prophylaxis
strategy overwhelmingly more effective, essentially com-
p l e t e l yp r e v e n t i n ga ne p i d e m i c( f i n a la t t a c kr a t eo f
0.06% from 33% baseline) while using only a 10,000 per
million stockpile. McCaw and McVernon [14], using a
differential equation-type of model, find that a treatment
and extended prophylaxis strategy could very effectively
postpone an epidemic. They assume a lower R0 than the
1.5 used here (for the same final attack rate) and note
that their model is very sensitive to seeding (or interven-
tion delay) assumptions. Also, the use of contact tracing
of 20%-40% of contacts (required for the long epidemic
postponements) for a uniform mixing model cannot be
directly compared to an individual-based model; tracing
from 4 to 8 out of 20 assumed contacts spread ran-
domly through the population may represent a harder
task than tracing 15 or so household and hub members
directly in contact with a diagnosed case. The study
reported in [27], while comprehensive, is not compar-
able with our study for the following reasons: the lowest
R0 considered was 1.7, the diagnosis ratio assumed was
60% or 80%, all scenarios included additional social dis-
tancing (in the workplace and wider community) which
was not widespread in 2009. Furthermore that study did
n o tc o n s i d e rt h eTo rT + H + Es t r a t e g i e sa n dd i dn o t
report on antiviral stockpile requirements.
Unlike antiviral medication, school closure has histori-
cally been used as an intervention measure in influenza
pandemics, usually as part of a “social distancing” policy.
Evidence from reviews of past studies [48,28] shows that
some benefits can be obtained from the closure of
schools during seasonal and pandemic influenza. How-
ever there is still substantial debate about if, when and
how school closure should be implemented during a
pandemic. Previous simulation studies have been per-
formed to address the issue of the potential effectiveness
of school closure, with varying results [20,22,23,49]. A
comparative study of different simulated school closure
interventions [7] concluded that effectiveness depends
on several factors about which little is known, such as
the relative proportion of infections that occur in the
school setting, the contact behaviour of pupils when
school closure is in effect, and the timing and duration
of school closure. In addition to the uncertain effective-
ness of school closure, it is also unclear which type of
school closure policy might be economically and socially
acceptable in a community during a pandemic. This
motivated us to improve upon previous work by closely
modelling several school closure strategies which actu-
ally took place at the early stages of the 2009 influenza
pandemic and we focussed on three particular school
closure/class isolation strategies. As information about
the contact behaviour of pupils during school closure
during the 2009 pandemic is only now appearing [45],
we made the assumption that pupils would make house-
hold and community contacts during school closure, but
no additional compensating contacts. Since the school
closure strategies we simulated actually occurred, we
can be sure that they represent practical and generally
acceptable measures. Although the interventions which
were implemented were generally of short duration, we
speculate that if the 2009 pandemic had exhibited a
higher case fatality ratio, longer durations of school clo-
sure would have been tolerated, or even demanded.
In the study reported here we have not modelled
other non-pharmaceutical interventions such as house-
hold quarantine, workplace closure or public gathering
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ing the 2009 pandemic. This is not because we believe
that these interventions are ineffective or unimportant;
on the contrary, combinations of rigorous social distan-
cing interventions may be the only way to arrest the
spread of a highly transmissible, highly pathogenic influ-
enza strain until vaccines are available, as determined
and discussed in [7,8].
Conclusions
The results suggest that antiviral drugs may be utilized
in a more effective manner, and have significantly more
impact for containing an influenza pandemic, than that
which occurred during the 2009 pandemic. Specifically,
the sustained use of antiviral drugs for treatment and
prophylaxis appears to be a better strategy than that
adopted in many countries, which restricted its use to
treatment-only at the early stages of the pandemic.
These results furthermore suggest that creating an anti-
viral drug stockpile of a size which allows a treatment
plus household antiviral strategy is optimal in terms of
cases averted per antiviral course. Simulation of a range
of school closure strategies and durations suggests that
isolating diagnosed individuals and contacts is less effec-
tive than closing whole schools, but that they need to be
closed for periods of at least two weeks for there to be a
significant benefit. Closure for periods beyond three
weeks is even more effective but is probably only feasi-
ble from a societal perspective if the pandemic has a
high case fatality ratio. The coupling of school closure
with each of the three antiviral strategies improves their
effectiveness in reducing both the daily incidence rate
and the overall attack rate. This indicates the value of
using school closure strategies, which were used in a
limited manner during the 2009 pandemic.
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